There can be little doubt that Paul Feyerabend is one of the most stimulating, exasperating, outrageous and challenging philosophers of our time. The comoarison that comes most readilv to mind is Nietzsche: in fact, I think of ~e~e r a b e n d as the Nietzsche of our day. Perhaps this explains why most of the reactions to Feyerabend's writings, especially Against Method ( A M ) and, as I expect, to his more recent Science in a Free Society GFS) are almost entirely negative and rather venomous.' He's usually dismissed a s a skeptic, an irrationalist, a crackpot, a crazy person, or some combination of these. I do not share this view, but think of Feyerabend as a mixture of a n old-fashioned liberal and a critical rationalist-by which I do not mean a Popperian, but a proponent of the humanistic tradition of Socrates and Mill. (More generally, I see him as part of the tradition whose members include the older sophist^,^ Nietzsche,' Wittgen~tein,~ as well as pragrnatists7 and e~istentialists.~ A fuller discussion of these comparisons is out of place here. ') In this discussion I shall confine myself to what I take to be the main outlines of the books under review.1° There are many important and even exciting chunks of these books (not to mention his other writings)--for instance, his remarks on Popper (AIM, pp. 213ff; SFS, pp AIM is subtitled "Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge." The opening sentence of the book reads: "'The following essay is written in the conviction that anarchism, while perhaps not the most attractive political philosophy, is certainly excellent medicine for epistemology and for the philosophy of science" (p. 17). What does Feyerabend intend this remark to convey? Among other things, he claims that epistemological standards and theories-for example, rationalism and empiricism-and philosophies of science---for example, inductivism, deductivism, and Popperianism-fail to provide a sound understanding of science or rationality; indeed, they distort attempts a t understanding. On his view, science, reason, history, and anthropology are inseparable; science and its history are part of the same process; and science and myth are inextricable components of a matrix consisting of a cosmology and a form of life (in the Wittgensteinian sense). Abstract categories, standards, and theories are useless by themselves. Feyerabend sometimes claims that people who appeal to scch abstractions, and not himself, are actually committed to the idea that "anything goes," since anything can be made consistent with such empty abstractions.
More fundamentally, since science, history, and human beings are evolving, adhering to a strict system of rules is detrimental to learning and human freedom. This is especially so today, when more science, and lots of philosophy, is either an ideology or a business; where truth, to say the least, is not the main goal. Thus, to claim that one can, as Popper and Kuhn do, start with the assumption that science is closer to the truth, and embodies more rational procedures, than any other form of life, and to proceed from there to glean abstract categories and rules that function as universal standards, is at best tendentious and at worst grossly mistaken. Even if science is rational, it's not the most or the only rational enterprise. At bottom, anarchism is required for two reasons (AM, p. 20). First, fallabilism coupled with relative human ignorance ("The world is a largely unknown place") requires it. Second, humanitarianism (including the goal of individual freedom and happiness) requires it. Unfortunately, science and philosophy today are detrimental to both of these goals, which make "Truth" secondary in importance for Feyerabend. As he says:
The attempt to increase liberty, to lead a full and rewarding life, a n d the corresponding attempt to discover the secrets of nature and of m a n entails, therefore, the rejection of all universal standards and of all rigid traditions. [AM, p. 201 Feyerabend claims that this attitude is rational today, although there may come a time when it's not reasonable to adopt this stance H M , p. 22).
In support of his claim that science, philosophy, and other "rigid" traditions (which, in other works, he often calls ideologies) undermine the twin goals of humanitarianism and the increase of knowledge, Feyerabend invokes the following claims: Science often succeeds only by violating accepted rules (AM, p. 23). Arguments often hinder progress and change (since the call to "'be reasonable" means "accept the status quo") (AM, p. Knowledge is not a series of self-consistent theories that converges towards an ideal view; it is not a gradual approach to the truth. It is rather an ever increasing ocean qf mutually incompatible (and perhaps even incommensurable) alternatives, each single theory, each fairy tale, each myth that is part of the collection forcing the others into greater articulation, and all of them contributing, via this process of competition, to the development of our consciousness. Nothing is ever settled, no view can ever be omitted from a comprehensive account. . . .Experts and laymen, professionals and dilettanti, truth-freaks and liars-they are all invited to participate in the contest and to make their contributions to the enrichment of our culture. The task of the scientist. . . is no longer 'to search for the truth', or to 'praise God', or 'to systematize observations', or 'to improve predictions.' These are but side effects of an activity to which his attention is mainly directed and which is to make the weaker case the stronger (as the sophists said) and thus to sustain the motion ofthe whole. [AM, p. 301 1 believe this to be the most important passage in all of Feyerabend's published work. The rest of AM is concerned with drawing out its method-ological implications-that science and its history are inseparable parti of the same process; that science and myth are parts of a cosmology; that reason and its standards must be supplenlented by history, anthropoiogj, drearns, etc.; that detaiied hermenentic investigations of other cosmologies.. cum-forms of life is inportant: and so on w, pp 223-3391. SPS lonks at the broader social, political, and cultural ramifications of the vkw expressed in the passage and seeks to undermine the idea that science--and scientism-is the One True Religion.
Feyerbend's view can be summed up as follows, Given the assumption of fallabilism and ignorance, the ideals of humanitarianism and the open society, the facts that science is ar, ideology, that scientisa is elitist and antidemocratic, and that freedom and hkippiness are more important than Truth, as conceived by scientism. we must, as he puts it, "keep aii our optiol~s open." Every tradition has its strengths and lrmits. The clash of traditions is required for learning and freedom. Objective knowledge requires the clash of incomn~ensnrabie alternatives, since knowledge consists, roughly speaking, in widening our horizons, while freedom consists in expanding our options. (This is why he calls for a separation of science and rhe state, to give people a reai education and real choices [ibM, pp. 295-3091).
These traditions must not rnereiy be tolerated; they must be taken serious&, which is v~hy, for Feyerabend, liberaiisrn and rationalism (as in scieniism) are in conflict, On Feyerbend's view the "bottom line," so to speak, is this: The hegemony of one tradition, viz., Western Rationalism. '"enforces a n unenlightened conformity, and speaks of truth. Liberal rationalists, and thus, no doubt, many readers of this journal, nil1 notice that Feyerabend is posing a dilemma for Engiighrensnent ideais: if "season" means the tradition of Western Rationalism (as he often calis it), then reason and freedom are incompatible. If freedom and humanitarianism mean, roughly, the Enlightenment ideals expressed in O n Liberw, then freedom cannot tolerate the appeal to Reason, as conceived by Western Rationaiism. At the same time, Feyerabend is not a skeptic or an irrationalist. Nor does he deny that there is objective knowledge. On the contrary, one of his claims is that scientism inhibits the g~owth of objective knowledge. While the issues he raises are sf fundamental importance, it is impossible to discuss them here. I shall, nevertheless, broach some of h e m in connection with my discussion of SF$, to which 3 now turn.
This book IS fairly recent, and a word 1s in order about its contents. In Part One, "Reason and Practice" (pp. 13-40), Feyerabend goes over the themes of AM, although the style is very much toned down (for Feyerabend, that is!): it's generally less polemical and vitriolic and (to my mind) makes its case more persuasively than corresponding pants ofAM. Part Two, "Science in a Free Society" (pp. 73-12), takes up and systematizes many themes of some of Feyerabend's occasional essays.12 It also extends the analysis of P a r t One and A M into the areas of culture and politics. I shall confine my discussion of SFS to these two sections. Part Three, "Conversations with Illiterates" (pp. 125-217), consists of reprints of Feyerabend's replies to some of the nastier and more distorted reviews of AM: Agassi, Gellner, Curthoys and Suchting, and others. 13 In these replies one finds many interesting restatements and embellishments on AM. Feyerabend is at his best here, although the essays are no less unkind than the reviews. I think he is entitled to be vitriolic against his critics, but at Ieast he's not infected by the hurnorless, self-righteous attitude of his reviewers. That, however, is one person's opinion. In any event, Feyerabend's replies are extremely provocative and are themselves worth the price of the book.
I turn now to a brief review of those features of SFS that relate to the AM themes discussed previously.
According to Feyerabend, rationalism, scientism, and traditional philosophical standards are embedded in a particular tradition and thus can't be used to judge other traditions. (In other words, the idea that they constitute an archimedean reference point outside all traditions is an illusion.) The clash between traditions. including that of Western Rationalism. and the re--sultant interaction between them, contributes to better theory and sounder practice. In fact, the clash between reason and practice is itself another example of the interactions between traditions. Feyerabend develops these claims by way of a discussion of idealism (ideas and standards of reason are autonomous and primary) and naturalism (reason is part of a tradition, which is autonomous and primary). The former view is associated with Popper, the latter with Burke, Kuhn, Polanyi. (Feyerabend's discussion of these views, and his related remarks on objectivity and subjectivity, reason and the passions, and rationality and skepticism [SFS, pp. 22-28, 163ffl are among the most interesting and instructive pants of SFS. They This position is an outgrowth of the AM passage about the "ocean of alternatives" view and of his antiscientism. It is also iniine with his allegiance to the humanistic tradition cited earlier in this review, which can perhaps be summed up by Gadamer's remark that it is a n enlightenment prejudice to think that traditions are per se irrational. (This is the "naturalism" of Burke, Kuhn, Polanyi, Wittgenstein, and Protagorasls that also alludes to themes in pragmatism and humanistic existentialism, e.g., in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.)
The passage also suggests that Feyerabend is not an irrationalist or a n extreme anarchist, since tradition is inescapable, useful, and reasonable up to a point. Yet, the idea that traditions are limited, that none deserves hegemony over all others, and thus require criticism and revision, explains his allegiance to Protagoras. But is Protagoras an enemy of reason? l 6 According to Feyerabend, "Protagorean relativism is reasonable because it pays attention to the pluralism of traditions and values. And it is civilized for it does not assume that one's own village and the strange customs it contains are the navel of the world" (SF&', p. 28). Once again, humanitarianism and Reason are at odds.
Feyerabend later introduces a fourth view, pragmatism, which has some positive value, although it is ultimately too uncritical. He says this about the attitude of a pragmatist: These remarks are related to Feyerabend's ideas about science and ideology, science education, the chauvinism of science in our society, and the tradition of Western Rationalism vis-8-vis other traditions. He evidently rejects the liberal view (expressed in OnLiberty18) that, since scientism and rationalism are archimedean reference points, and since freedom and Reason vary directly, it is a mistake to let people believe what is false, or believed false. According to this view only true beliefs, or beliefs that aren't settled, are to be tolerated. Ignorance is the only justification for tolerance, etc. Feyerabend's connections to Protagoras, Wittgenstein, Nietzsche, and others come out in his rejection of this view. (His remarks also show that the humanistic tradition, which consists also of Mill, Popper, and Socrates, is ambivalent on these issues.) Freedom as a higher value than Truth or Reason comes out here. So do similarities with writers such as Winch, Gadamer, and others.19 Feyerabend's development of a hermeneutical understanding of natural philosophy and science in AIM is supplemented by a hermeneutical stance toward the understanding of traditions, which is coupled with a n attack on the chauvinism of experts in our society and with Western Imperialism (SFS, pp. 63-65). Finally, a free society is a democratic society, where the people rule, so that if they want their children taught unpopular and allegedly 'bnscientific" beliefs and traditions (astrology, creationism, etc.) they have a right to do so.
For Feyerabend, the main questions a free society must face are these: "How can a society that gives all traditions equal rights be realized? Mow can science be removed from the dominant position it now has?" (SFS, p. 9). Science, in short, is no longer a liberating influence (SFS, p. 75), since it poses as the One True Religion (SFS, pp. 20ff). Feyerabend distinguishes, however, between philosophical and political relativism and denies the view that all ideas are of equal worth GFS, pp. &Off). But recognizing this doesn't justify chauvinism of any kind, according to him. These and other remarks, which cannot even be mentioned here, clearly show that humanitarianism, as conceived by Feyerabend, takes priority over everything else.20 Anyone who holds the contrary opinion will not, in good conscience, be able to ignore his work. One can reject it, argue with it, even curse it. But to dismiss it as the work of a crank, madman, or irrationalist would be bad faith and self-deception of the highest order.
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